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Abstract
We study an adverse selection environment, where a rational seller
can trade a good of which she privately knows its value to a buyer, and
there are gains from trade. The buyer’s types differ in their degree of
inferential abilities: A rational type correctly infers the value of the
good from the seller’s offer, whereas a naive type under-appreciates
the correlation between the seller’s private information and offer. We
characterize the optimal menu mechanism that maximizes the social
surplus. Notably, no matter how severe the adverse selection is (in
particular, even when no trade is the unique possible outcome if all
agents are rational), all types of buyers trade in the optimal mecha-
nism. The rational buyer’s trade occurs at the expense of the naive
buyer’s losses. We also investigate a consumer-protection policy of
limiting the losses and discuss its implications.
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From the seminal work of Akerlof (1970), adverse selection and resulting
market collapses have been extensively investigated. Samuelson (1984) and
Attar, Mariotti, and Salanié (2011) show that, under a certain condition,
a no-trade outcome is the only incentive-feasible allocation. These results
build on a classical assumption that all parties are fully rational, in particu-
lar, an uninformed buyer can correctly infer the seller’s type from observing
her offer.1 However, recent experimental and empirical evidence suggests
that some buyers are systematically biased in that they fail to recognize
the informational content of others’ actions.2 Eyster and Rabin (2005) pro-
pose a solution concept which incorporates such inferential mistakes (called
a cursed equilibrium) in which a naive agent fails to infer other agents’ pri-
vate information from their actions.3 Under severe adverse selection (i.e., an
environment where only no-trade outcome is possible by rational agents) and
the homogeneous type of buyer, Eyster and Rabin (2005) show that trade
can occur between such naive buyers and (relatively) low-value sellers.4
Building on, but beyond these studies, we analyze one-sided adverse se-
lection problems with heterogeneous inferential abilities. In the model, a
rational seller has a single unit of a good v ∈ [0, 1], which is her private
information. Gains from trade is denoted by α > 1 in that a buyer’s value of
the good is αv. Generalizing Eyster and Rabin (2005), we consider an envi-
1We use female pronouns to refer to a seller and male pronouns to refer to a buyer.
2See, for instance, Brown, Camerer, and Lovallo (2012), Enke and Zimmermann (2019),
Enke (2020), and Jin, Luca, and Martin (2021). There is also accumulating evidence that,
in some industries, a fraction of buyers make suboptimal inferences and purchase decisions;
see Heidhues and Kőszegi (2018) on consumer behavior in markets and Beshears, Choi,
Laibson, and Madrian (2018) on household decision makings.
3For theoretical works applying the concept of cursed equilibrium, see Eyster, Rabin,
and Vayanos (2019), Kondor and Kőszegi (2017), and Ispano and Schwardmann (2017).
4As related theoretical studies, Jehiel (2005) and Jehiel and Koessler (2008) propose
an analogy-based expectation equilibrium in which an agent bundles unobserved states into
analogy classes. Spiegler (2016) develops a model of non-rational expectations based on a
Bayesian-network approach. For reviews, see Eyster (2019) and Jehiel (2020).
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ronment where the buyer is either a rational type (i.e., a standard Bayesian
type) or a naive type (i.e., he under-appreciates the correlation between the
seller’s private information and action).
It turns out that environments with the co-existence of rational and naive
types of buyers are fundamentally different from those with either a rational
or naive type only. Notably, even with severe adverse selection where no
trade would be the unique possible outcome if only rational agents existed,
we show that, with the co-existence of rational and naive types, there exists
a mechanism in which both types of buyers trade with positive probabil-
ity. Intuitively, the trade between the naive buyer and the low-value seller
generates positive externalities to other types: given that the (relatively)
low-value seller trades with the naive buyer, there exists a mutually agree-
able offer between the (relatively) high-value seller and the rational buyer,
which generates a positive trade surplus.
We characterize optimal menu mechanisms when the buyer’s type of infer-
ential ability is heterogeneous. We show that the optimal mechanism always
involves the rational buyer’s trade with positive probability. The mecha-
nism has the double-separation property : The seller types are separated so
that the (relatively) low-value seller offers a low-price option that is traded
with the naive buyer, and the higher-value seller takes a higher-price option
that is traded with the rational buyer. When the buyer’s value follows ei-
ther the binary distribution or the power distribution (including the uniform
distribution), the optimal menu mechanism has only two trading options.
With a modest condition, the mechanism achieves a strictly higher expected
total surplus than the one-option mechanism, and with cross-subsidization
between different types of the buyer, ex ante Pareto improvement may also
be possible.
Nevertheless, we show that it is impossible for both types of buyers to
make non-negative expected payoffs. It implies that the naive buyer’s loss
is necessary for achieving a positive trade surplus.5 Hence, as a potential
5In a companion paper (Murooka and Yamashita, 2020), we show that this impossibility
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consumer-protection policy which can go together with the positive trade sur-
plus, we investigate partial protection of the buyer in that the naive buyer’s
loss in terms of his (actual) expected payoff is limited to a certain amount.
We characterize the optimal menu mechanism under the consumer protec-
tion. The optimal mechanism still exhibits the double-separation property,
and it highlights a new trade-off between the naive buyer’s protection and
the social surplus.
This paper belongs to the growing literature on behavioral mechanism
design and behavioral contract theory.6 As most closely related to ours,
Eliaz and Spiegler (2006, 2008) and Heidhues and Kőszegi (2010) investigate
optimal contract designs with different degrees of agent naivety. In contrast
to these studies, we focus on the market for lemons and shed light on the
new positive externality to rational agents, as well as discussing its economic
implications.
Our results are also related to the literature on behavioral industrial or-
ganization, in particular, interplays between rational and naive consumers.
Most studies have focused on negative externalities imposed by rational con-
sumers, e.g., cross-subsidization from naive to rational consumers (Gabaix
and Laibson, 2006; Heidhues, Kőszegi, and Murooka, 2017; Jehiel, 2018).7
For positive externalities from naive to rational consumers, de Clippel, Eliaz,
and Rozen (2014) and Johnen (2020) show that equilibrium prices can be
lower if there are more naive consumers in the market. Our result high-
lights a positive externality from naive to rational consumers too, but its
logic is quite different: We show that the trade between a rational buyer
and a (relatively) high-type seller occurs in the market for lemons, because
a (relatively) low-type seller trades with a naive buyer. Based on this novel
separation property, we investigate the welfare implications of the optimal
result holds for any kind of behavioral errors.
6See Kőszegi (2014) for a review.
7Herweg and Müller (2016) analyze the market for lemons with an overconfident buyer.
Different from our results, they show that a high-quality good is traded with the overcon-
fident buyer in equilibrium, whereas a rational buyer is crowded out of the market.
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menu mechanism, the impossibility of full consumer protection, and the effect
of partial consumer protection.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up a model of
one-sided adverse selection and introduce each type of agents. In Section 3,
we illustrate the properties of the optimal trade mechanism when the buyer’s
value follows the binary distribution. In Section 4, we analyze the optimal
trade mechanism under general distributions and its properties. In Section
5, we investigate partial protection of the (naive) buyer. Section 6 discusses
other extensions and concludes.
2 Model
A seller has a single unit of a good, whose value to her is v ∈ [0, 1] as her
private information. A buyer’s value is αv. The buyer does not know v, but
only knows that it follows a distribution with cdf F . Let µ = E[v] denote
its mean, and in case F admits a density, let f denote its density. They are
risk neutral in monetary transfers. If the good is traded with probability
q ∈ [0, 1] with monetary transfer p ∈ R, then the seller’s payoff is p− vq, and
the buyer’s payoff is αvq − p. Hence, the social surplus from trade is given
by S = (α − 1)vq. We assume α > 1 so that it is socially optimal to always
make them trade. We also assume that α is not too large:
αE[v|v ≤ p]− p < 0, (1)
for all p > 0.8 As is well-known in the literature, Condition (1) implies severe
adverse selection in the sense that only no-trade outcome can be incentive-
feasible (if the agents are rational). To provide some intuition, note that, if
the reverse of this inequality holds for some p > 0, then there is a simple
posted-price scheme that induces some trading: Any seller type v ≤ p would
wish to trade with price p, and the buyer would accept it as his expected
8For example, if v follows a uniform distribution, then the condition is equivalent to
α < 2.
5
payoff is E[αv − p|v ≤ p] ≥ 0. Condition (1) says that, except for p = 0,
such a mutually-agreeable price does not exist.
In the main part of the paper, we consider the following class of “menu
mechanisms” as possible trading protocols. A menu mechanism is denoted
by (qm, pm)
M
m=0, where M ∈ N, (q0, p0) = (0, 0), and for each m = 1, . . . ,M ,
qm ∈ [0, 1] and pm ∈ R. In the mechanism, the seller (knowing his v) chooses
one option in the menu, say m. Then, the buyer, without knowing v but
observing the seller’s choice m, either accepts it or rejects it. If accepted, then
the trade happens with probability qm with monetary transfer pm; otherwise,
no trade occurs.9 Our goal is to obtain insights about the mechanisms that
are optimal in terms of the expected social surplus.
The key element of the analysis is the buyer’s belief updating given the
seller’s choice in the menu. We assume that the buyer has one of the two
types: a rational type, or a naive type. The rational type is a standard
“Bayesian rational” type: Once he sees the seller’s choice of (qm, pm), he
correctly updates his belief about the seller’s value v, and then makes an
acceptance decision. The naive type, on the other hand, (incorrectly) believes
that the seller’s choice of (qm, pm) does not convey any information about v
to him, and hence, he makes an acceptance decision without updating his
belief. Let ψ ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of the rational type among the
buyers, and 1 − ψ denote the fraction of the naive type. Our formulation
of the naive type coincides with the fully cursed agent in Eyster and Rabin
(2005), as well as the coarsest analogy partition and the private information
analogy partition in Jehiel and Koessler (2008). We discuss several kinds of
extensions incorporating a partially-naive type in Section 6.1.
Given each v, let σ(v) ∈ {0, . . . ,M} denote the seller’s choice. Given
the seller’s choice m ∈ {0, . . . ,M}, let dr(m), dn(m) ∈ {0, 1} denote the
9The class of mechanisms may appear restrictive; for example, the buyer cannot input
any message other than his acceptance decision. Nevertheless, as long as a mechanism
follows the posterior implementability developed by Green and Laffont (1987), the qual-
itative feature of the paper would not change with a more general class of mechanisms.
We discuss this point in Section 6.2.
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rational and naive buyer’s acceptance decisions, respectively. A strategy
profile (σ(·), dr(·), dn(·)), or simply (σ, d), is a (Bayesian) equilibrium if it
satisfies:
• (IC) Incentive compatibility for the seller: For each v andm ∈ {0, . . . ,M},
pσ(v) − vqσ(v)[ψdr(σ(v)) + (1− ψ)dn(σ(v))]
≥ pm − vqm[ψdr(m) + (1− ψ)dn(m)];
• (IR-r) Individual rationality for the rational type of buyer: For each








(αvqm − pm)1{σ(v)=m}dF ;
• (IR-n) Individual rationality for the naive type of buyer: For each
m ∈ {0, . . . ,M},
dn(m)(αµqm − pm) ≥ (1− dn(m))(αµqm − pm).
Given an equilibrium, the expected social surplus is:∫ 1
0
(α− 1)vqσ(v)[ψdr(σ(v)) + (1− ψ)dn(σ(v))]dF,





(α− 1)vqσ(v)[ψdr(σ(v)) + (1− ψ)dn(σ(v))]dF
sub. to (IC), (IR-r), (IR-n).
Two benchmark results are well-known in the literature. First, if only
the rational type exists (ψ = 1), then as in Samuelson (1984), a no-trade
mechanism is optimal under Condition (1): q(v) = p(v) = 0 for all v ∈ [0, 1].
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Second, if only the naive type exists (ψ = 0), then as in Eyster and Rabin
(2005), an optimal mechanism exhibits M = 1 (i.e., one-price mechanism)
with (q1, p1) = (1, αµ): In the mechanism, the seller with v > αµ chooses
(q0, p0) = (0, 0), and hence no trade happens regardless of the buyer’s choice;
the seller with v < αµ chooses (q1, p1) = (1, αµ), and the (naive) buyer
accepts it. The expected total surplus is:∫ αµ
0
(α− 1)vdF ≥ 0.
Despite its trade possibility, note that the buyer’s expected payoff is neces-
sarily negative due to Condition (1):∫ αµ
0
(αv − αµ)dF
= αE[v|v ≤ αµ]− αµ < 0.
3 Illustration with Binary-Value Distribution
Some of the main results of the paper (though not all) can be simply illus-
trated with a binary-value distribution: v = 1 with probability µ ∈ (0, 1)
and v = 0 with probability 1 − µ (and hence, E[v] = µ). In this case,
Condition (1) is equivalent to αµ < 1.
In the binary case, both benchmarks yield zero expected surplus: Even if
only the naive type exists (ψ = 0), only the seller with v = 0 wishes to trade.
So the resulting surplus is zero and the buyer earns a negative payoff −αµ.
Now we illustrate that, if ψ ∈ (0, 1), then there exists a mechanism that
achieves strictly positive expected surplus. In this sense, environments with
co-existence of rational and naive types are fundamentally different from
those with either a rational or naive type only.
We first analyze the case with ψ < αµ
1+αµ
. Consider the menu mechanism
where the seller chooses (q, p) ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 1), (1, αµ)} (and the buyer accepts
or rejects what the seller chooses). It is easy to verify that the following
constitutes an equilibrium: The seller chooses (q, p) = (1, 1) if v = 1, while
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(q, p) = (1, αµ) if v = 0; and the rational buyer accepts only (q, p) = (1, 1),
while the naive buyer accepts only (q, p) = (1, αµ).10
The trading possibilities are summarized in the following table:
naive rational
v = 0 X
v = 1 X
The expected surplus is now strictly positive: ψ(α−1) > 0. The intuition
is simple. In this mechanism, the seller with v = 0 is matched with the naive
buyer with price αµ. Given that they are out, now only the seller with v = 1
remains. Therefore, we can find a mutually agreeable price (e.g., p = 1) for
the seller with v = 1 and the rational buyer, and their trade creates positive
trade surplus. In this sense, the existence of the naive type generates a
“positive externality” to the high-value seller and the rational buyer. On
the other hand, note that this positive externality is at the cost of the naive
buyer’s loss.
The expected surplus is increasing in ψ as long as ψ < αµ
1+αµ
, but this
mechanism no longer works once ψ becomes higher than αµ
1+αµ
. This is be-
cause, with ψ > αµ
1+αµ
, even the low-value seller prefers (q, p) = (1, 1) to
(1, αµ). In this case, we can modify the mechanism by partially suppressing
the trade with price p = 1 in order to restore the incentive feasibility. More
specifically, consider the modified menu mechanism where the seller chooses
(q, p) ∈ {(0, 0), (q∗, 1), (1, αµ)}, where q∗ = (1−ψ)αµ
ψ
< 1. In this mechanism,
the same “separating” strategy profile as above continues to be an equilib-
rium: The seller with v = 0 chooses (q, p) = (1, αµ) which is only accepted
by the naive buyer; while the seller with v = 1 chooses (q, p) = (q∗, 1) which
10It is immediate that the naive buyer accepts only (q, p) = (1, αµ). The rational buyer
accepts only (q, p) = (1, 1) because (q, p) = (1, 1) means that the seller’s type is v = 1 (and
hence trading yields the rational buyer’s expected payoff of α− 1 > 0). Given the buyer’s
behavior, the seller with v = 1 earns zero payoff by choosing (1, 1), while choosing (1, αµ)
yields a negative expected payoff; the seller with v = 0 prefers (1, αµ) to (1, 1) despite its
lower price (recall αµ < 1), because ψ < αµ1+αµ is equivalent to (1 − ψ)αµ > ψ and the
seller with v = 0 prefers to sell the good to the naive buyer who only accepts (1, αµ).
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is only accepted by the rational buyer. In particular, note that the seller
v = 0 (weakly) prefers (q, p) = (1, αµ) to (q∗, 1) because (1 − ψ)αµ ≥ ψq∗.
The expected surplus is again strictly positive:
ψq∗(α− 1) = (1− ψ)αµ(α− 1) > 0.
Note that this is decreasing in ψ, and in particular, converging to zero as
ψ → 1, consistent with Samuelson (1984).
In both of the cases, the mechanisms are doubly-separating : The seller
types are separated so that the low-value seller takes a low-price option that
the high-value seller does not take, and the high-value seller takes a high-
price option that the low-value seller does not take. The buyer types are
separated too so that the naive type only accepts the low-price option, while
the rational type only accepts the high-price option. The low-value seller
is matched with the naive type, and the high-value seller is matched with
the rational type. In the next section, we show that this double-separation
property is a necessary feature of the optimal mechanism with a general class
of distributions.
In terms of the induced trade surplus, there are several observations that
do (or do not) continue to hold with more general distributions. First, be-
cause of the positive externality made by the naive buyer, the rational buyer
earns a strictly higher expected payoff than under the “one-option” menu
mechanism, {(qm, pm)}Mm=0 = {(0, 0), (1, αµ)}. On the other hand, the naive
buyer and the seller continue to earn the same expected payoff. In this sense,
relative to the optimal mechanisms in the two benchmarks, our mechanism
attains Pareto improvement. With a general class of distributions, it is not
necessarily the case, because the existence of the rational type may cause a
negative externality to the naive type, which does not occur in the binary
case.
Second, the expected surplus is non-monotone in ψ, and more impor-
tantly, the peak is with an interior ψ. We think it has an important im-
plication in consumer education: The peak with ψ > 0 means that some
consumer education could be socially beneficial, depending on the “current”
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ψ. With a general class of distributions, the peak may or may not be with
an interior ψ.
Finally, in the optimal mechanism above, the naive buyer earns a strictly
negative payoff by matching with the low-value seller, while the rational buyer
earns a strictly positive payoff. Thus, there might seem to be a room for cross-
subsidization to make both buyer types better off (in the actual expected
payoff).11 However, we show that such cross-subsidization is impossible,
regardless of the (binary or non-binary) distribution. That is, if a mechanism
achieves strictly positive expected surplus, it necessarily implies that the
naive buyer earns a strictly negative expected payoff.
4 Doubly-Separating Menu and Its Welfare
Properties
In this section, we first show that the double-separation property is a neces-
sary feature of the optimal mechanism with a general class of distributions.
We then investigate welfare properties of the optimal mechanism.
4.1 Main theorem
We first state our main theorem that characterizes the optimal menu mech-
anism {(qm, pm)}Mm=0, where (q0, p0) = (0, 0) is (if any) chosen by the seller
with the highest values and (qM , pM) = (1, αµ) is chosen by the seller with
the lowest values.
Theorem 1. An optimal menu mechanism {(qm, pm)}Mm=0 has (i) M ≥ 1,





for m = 1, . . . ,M − 1, and is (iv)
associated with the following equilibrium: There exists v∗ ≤ αµ such that the
seller with v < v∗ chooses m = M , and the seller with v > v∗ chooses m 6= M ;
11Recall that each type of the buyer’s perceived expected payoff is always non-negative,
although it is not correct for the naive type ex post.
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the naive buyer accepts only (qM , pM), and the rational buyer accepts any
(qm, pm) except (qM , pM).
As in the binary case, the mechanism separates the seller types based on
some threshold type v∗. The optimal v∗ depends on specific distributions.
It also separates the naive buyer and the rational buyer. The fundamental
intuition for this mechanism to achieve a positive surplus is similar to the
binary case: The seller with v < v∗ is matched with the naive type by
choosing a lower-price option, (qM , pM) = (1, αµ). Given this, the seller with
v > v∗ can trade with the rational buyer with higher-price options (qm, pm)
where m = 1, . . . ,M − 1.
In general, different from the binary distribution case, there may exist
multiple options that further separate the high-value seller types. For a
certain class of environments, however, at most two options (in addition to
the no-trade option) would be enough.
Example 1. Let F be a power distribution, F (v) = vγ with γ > 0.12 Then,
µ = γ
1+γ
and Condition (1) becomes αµ < 1.
In the power-distribution case, the optimal mechanism is a doubly-separating
menu mechanism with only two trading options, as summarized in Proposi-
tion 1.
Proposition 1. Let F be a power distribution, F (v) = vγ, with γ > 0 and
αµ < 1. Then, the optimal menu mechanism is {(qm, pm)}Mm=0 with M = 2,
(q0, p0) = (0, 0), p1 > αµ, and (q2, p2) = (1, αµ).
There are three properties in the optimal mechanism with the binary
distribution: (i) The optimal mechanism (a two-option mechanism in the
binary case) Pareto dominates the one-option mechanism; (ii) the expected
total surplus is maximized at an interior ψ; and (iii) the naive-type buyer
necessarily makes a loss. In the following subsections, we reexamine those
properties in more general non-binary environments.
12A uniform distribution is a special case with γ = 1.
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4.2 Suboptimality of one-price mechanism
The above theorem does not exclude a possibility that the one-option mech-
anism is optimal. The next proposition provides a sufficient condition with
which a strictly better mechanism than the one-price mechanism exists.
Proposition 2. If vf(v) is (locally) strictly increasing at v = αµ, then the
optimal mechanism achieves strictly higher expected social surplus than the
one-option mechanism.
Note that for any differentiable f(·), (vf(v))′ = f(v) + vf ′(v), and the
second term approaches 0 as v approaches 0. Hence, many popular distribu-
tions satisfy the condition if αµ is sufficiently small. Proposition 2 implies
that inducing the trade between a (relatively) high-value seller and a rational
buyer is surplus-enhancing. To provide some intuition, consider the follow-
ing two-option mechanism: {(0, 0), (q, p), (1, αµ)}. The optimal one-option
mechanism does not have the option (q, p), and thus, under the one-option
mechanism, any seller with type v < αµ trades with the naive buyer, while
any seller type with v > αµ does not trade. With the additional option
(q, p) with p > αµq, any seller type with v < v∗ trades with the naive buyer,
and any seller type with v ∈ (v∗, p) trades with the rational buyer. That
v∗ < αµ may be interpreted as a “skimming” phenomenon: The seller with
v ∈ (v∗, αµ) corresponds to the high-end of those types who would trade
with the naive buyer without the new option (q, p). With the new option,
these sellers now trade with the rational buyer, and both the seller and the
rational buyer are better off with this new option.
4.3 Pareto improvement relative to the one-option mech-
anism
Recall that, with a binary distribution, the two-option mechanism achieves
“ex post” Pareto improvement relative to the one-option mechanism: The
rational buyer is better off, and the naive buyer and the seller are indifferent.
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With continuous distributions, it is impossible for the optimal mecha-
nism to attain ex post Pareto improvement relative to the one-option mecha-
nism, because the above skimming logic clearly implies that the naive buyer
is worse off without cross-subsidization. However, it may be possible to
achieve “ex ante” Pareto improvement: The buyer’s average expected pay-
off of both types (with these types’ probability weights) may be improved.
And of course, if the buyer is ex ante Pareto improved, then appropriate
cross-subsidization can make all the buyer types ex post Pareto improved.
Example 2. 1. By a continuity argument, even if F is continuous, if F
is not too far from a binary distribution (e.g., a continuous bi-modal
distribution with peaks close to v = 0 and v = 1), the optimal mecha-
nism can achieve ex ante Pareto improvement relative to the one-option
mechanism, and hence ex post Pareto improvement after appropriate
cross-subsidization.
2. Let F be a power distribution, where F (v) = vγ with γ > 0. Then, un-
der the optimal mechanism with any incentive-feasible cross-subsidization,
the payoff of the naive type is strictly lower than the one-price mecha-
nism.13 Intuitively, this is because the seller receives most of the gains
of the social surplus.
4.4 “Best mixture” of behavioral types and consumer
education




µ(α−1)vdF if ψ = 0. Recall that, with a binary distribution, the social
surplus is maximized with an interior ψ. This has an important implication
for consumer education: If the “current” ψ is less than that achieves the
13Note that any cross-subsidy from a seller to a buyer is not possible in the optimal
mechanism, as the seller’s payoff for each v is uniquely pinned down up to a constant, and
the seller with v = 1 earns zero payoff under the above optimal mechanism.
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peak, then consumer education can increase the social surplus.14
Not all distributions induce an interior peak of ψ. For example, if v ∼
U(0, 1) and α ∈ (4
3
, 2), then the social surplus in the optimal mechanism
is decreasing in ψ. Therefore, any consumer education reduces the social
surplus in this case.
A sufficient condition for an interior peak is that the expected social
surplus is increasing as a function of ψ, locally around ψ = 0:






then the expected social surplus is maximized at some interior ψ.
To prove the result with some intuition, consider the following menu
mechanism: {(qm, pm)}Mm=0 = {(0, 0), (1, p), (1, αµ)} with p > αµ. In the
associated equilibrium, the seller with v < v(ψ) chooses (1, αµ), which is
accepted only by the naive buyer; while the seller with v ∈ (v(ψ), p) chooses
(1, p), which is accepted only by the rational buyer, where v(ψ) represents
the indifferent type:
ψ(p− v(ψ)) = (1− ψ)(αµ− v(ψ)) ⇔ v(ψ) = αµ− p− αµ
1− 2ψ
ψ,
which is positive if ψ is sufficiently close to 0.
























14However, a careful subsidy scheme may be necessary in its execution. Obviously, those
who get educated are better off, while the other kinds of buyers, that is, those who are not
educated (either naive before and after the policy, or rational before and after the policy),
can be worse off.
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The first term in the square brackets in 2 is a direct effect of decreasing
a fraction of the naive buyer: The surplus created by the naive type trading
with the seller with v < αµ is lost, if a fraction of the naive buyer in the
society is replaced by the rational buyer. Note that this negative effect does
not exist in the binary case, because no surplus is directly created by the
naive buyer (because he trades with the seller with v = 0 only). The third
term in the square brackets in 2 is a direct effect of increasing the rational
buyer, because this type of the buyer can enjoy a positive externality made
by the naive type. The second term in the square brackets in 2 is negative
externality made by the rational type on the naive type, based on the above
“skimming” logic: With a higher fraction of the rational type in the society,
the threshold type of the seller is lower, which implies a larger negative
externality.
Example 3. Let F be a power distribution: F (v) = vγ with γ > 0. If γ < 1
5
and α < 5
4
, then the expected social surplus is maximized at ψ > 0.
4.5 Exploitation of naivete
As in the binary- or power-distribution cases, in the optimal menu mecha-
nism, the naive buyer earns a negative expected payoff, while the rational
buyer can earn a strictly positive expected payoff. This suggests a possibility
of cross-subsidization from the rational buyer to the naive buyer, so that
both types can enjoy non-negative expected payoffs.
The next result shows that this cannot be true in a strong sense. In
any mechanism (not only the one that maximizes expected social surplus,
but any other one, such as the one that maximizes only the buyer surplus)
with non-trivial trading, the naive buyer’s expected payoff must be strictly
negative.
Proposition 4. If there exists a menu mechanism and its associated equi-
librium where the buyer’s ex-ante expected payoff is non-negative, then the
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expected social surplus must be 0, and in this sense, it is equivalent to the
no-trade outcome.
Remark 1. The proof of the above result does not formally consider cross-
subsidization, but it is immediate that the result implies impossibility of mak-
ing both types earn non-negative expected payoffs with cross-subsidization.
Indeed, if both types earn non-negative expected payoffs with cross-subsidization,
then it must be the case that the buyer’s ex ante expected payoff is non-
negative, contradicting the proposition. In a companion paper (Murooka and
Yamashita, 2020), we extend the above result: For any type of behavioral
errors naive buyers make and for any incentive-feasible mechanism, either the
expected payoff of some naive buyer must be strictly negative or the no-trade
outcome occurs.
Proposition 4 implies that, to achieve a positive social surplus, we cannot
“fully” protect the naive buyer by giving him a non-negative payoff. Still,
it may be possible to “partially” protect the naive buyer by preventing him
from a large negative payoff. We investigate this issue in Section 5.
5 (Partial) Protection of Naive Buyer
Proposition 4 in the previous section shows that a positive social surplus
and a non-negative payoff of the naive buyer cannot go together, so we can-
not “fully” protect the naive buyer under trade. However, it is possible to
“partially” protect the naive type in the sense of avoiding large losses, by
giving up (but not entirely) some trade surplus. In practice, a policymaker’s
goal may be to find a right balance between the social surplus and consumer
protection.
In this section, we study the optimal mechanism under partial protection
of the naive buyer. Specifically, consider the same surplus maximization
problem as before, but with the additional constraint that the naive buyer’s
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(actual) expected payoff is bounded from below by some fixed −L ≤ 0:∫
v
(αvqσ(v) − pσ(v))dc(σ(v)) ≥ −L.
Call it Problem (1;L). The previous sections consider the case with suffi-
ciently large L, and Proposition 4 implies that L = 0 is possible only under
the no-trade mechanism. We now investigate the case with intermediate
L > 0.
An alternative, equivalent problem is that the principal maximizes a
weighted sum of the social surplus and the naive buyer’s (actual) expected
payoff, where the weight is one for the social surplus and φ ≥ 0 for the naive
buyer’s expected payoff. Call it Problem (2;φ). A standard Lagrangian ar-
gument shows that each Problem (1;L) is equivalent to Problem (2;φ) for
some φ, and vice versa. This Problem (2;φ) can be interpreted as a situation
where the principal has a higher “Pareto weight” for the naive buyer.
We show that the optimal menu mechanism is again doubly-separating,
where the naive buyer trades with relatively low-value sellers (only) and the
rational buyer trades with relatively high-value sellers (only). In this sense,
the qualitative nature of the optimal mechanism is the same as in Theorem
1. However, in order to protect the naive buyer, the terms of trade may be
modified.
Proposition 5. An optimal menu mechanism {(qm, pm)}Mm=0 has M ≥ 1,
and there exists m∗ ∈ {1, . . . ,M} such that (qm, pm) ≤ (1, αµ) for m ≥ m∗
and pm > αµ for m < m
∗. It is associated with the following equilibrium:
There exists v∗ such that the seller with v < v∗ chooses some m ≥ m∗, and
the seller with v > v∗ chooses some m < m∗.
Example 4. Recall the binary example with v ∈ {0, 1} with Pr(v = 1) = µ
and αµ < 1. The optimal menu mechanism with any L induces the same
trading pattern: The seller with v = 0 trades with the naive buyer, and the
seller with v = 1 trades with the rational buyer. However, the allocation
that the low-value seller offers is not necessarily (q, p) = (1, αµ), in order to
protect the naive buyer.
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Let (q, p) ≤ (1, αµ) be the allocation that the low-value seller offers and
the naive buyer accepts; and let (q′, 1) be the allocation that the high-value
seller offers and the rational buyer accepts.15 Then, the surplus-maximization




sub. to (1− ψ)qp ≥ q′ψ,
p ≤ αµ,
−qp ≥ −L,
where the first constraint is the low-value seller’s incentive compatibility, the
second constraint is the naive buyer’s individual rationality, and the third
constraint corresponds to the protection of the naive buyer. The other con-
straints (i.e., the high-value seller’s incentive compatibility and the rational
buyer’s individual rationality constraints) are omitted because they do not
bind.
When L is sufficiently large (i.e., L ≥ αµ), the constraint of protecting
the naive buyer does not bind. Indeed, with L ≥ αµ, the same optimal
mechanism obtains: q = 1, p = αµ, and q′ = min{1, 1−ψ
ψ
αµ}.
When L < αµ, the constraint of protecting the naive buyer is binding.
An optimal mechanism is q = 1, p = L, and q′ = min{1, 1−ψ
ψ
L}. First,
this new mechanism protects the naive buyer by limiting the price to be L
instead of αµ. Second, as a consequence, the trade probability between the
high-value seller and the rational buyer can also be limited. Because of this
second effect, the expected social surplus may become lower, but instead, the
naive buyer is better off.
In Example 4, imposing L close to αµ does not reduce the social sur-
15It is without loss to assume that the high-value seller’s price in the optimal menu
mechanism is 1. First, it cannot be strictly less than 1 because of the seller’s individual
rationality. Second, for any allocation for the high-value seller (and the rational buyer)
with price strictly greater than 1, we can achieve a weakly higher expected surplus by
lowering the price (and keeping the other parts of the allocations the same).
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plus by much, while it increases the naive buyer’s payoff. Indeed, when
1−ψ
ψ
αµ < 1, such a regulation affects neither the rational buyer’s payoff nor
the social surplus. In this sense, this consumer protection with a moderate
level of L > 0 is in line with asymmetric paternalism: it benefits consumers
who may make errors, while it imposes no (or relatively little) harm on ratio-
nal consumers (Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin,
2003).
The above consumer protection provides a rationale for caps on contract
attributes and other regulations which moderately limit the ex-post losses
of buyers. For example, the European Union’s principle on unfair terms in
consumer contracts prohibits a contractual term that “causes a significant
imbalance [...] to the detriment of the consumer,” so a transaction that is too
disadvantageous to the consumer is disallowed.16 Also, the Consumer Affairs
Agency in Japan stipulates that consumer contract clauses with “a fixed
penalty for contract cancellation in a total amount that exceeds the average
amount of damages that the trader would incur from the cancellation” are
void, which effectively limits the losses of buyers.17
6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this section, we discuss (i) a model that incorporates a partially-naive
buyer and (ii) analysis under more general mechanisms. While a thorough
investigation of these exercises is beyond the scope of this paper, we illustrate
a framework for the analysis and give a couple of remarks.
16Article 3 of directive 93/13/EEC of the Council of the European Com-
missions, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:31993L0013:en:HTML#d1e245-29-1 (accessed September 1, 2021).





So far, we have analyzed the model in which a naive buyer is fully naive in
the sense of Eyster and Rabin (2005). We now discuss how our analysis can
be extended to cases in which a fraction of buyer is partially naive.
Motivated by Eyster and Rabin (2005), here we assume that a fraction
1 − ψ of the buyers is partially naive in the following sense (and the other
fraction ψ is rational, as before): Observing that the seller has chosen an
option m ∈ {0, . . . ,M}, the partially-naive buyer’s anticipated value of the
good is a weighted average of µ with weight χ ∈ [0, 1] and µ̃m with weight
1−χ, where µ̃ is specified below. Note that our previous analysis covers the
case with χ = 1.
Then, (IR-n) becomes: For each m ∈ {0, . . . ,M},
dn(m){α[χµ+ (1− χ)µ̃m]qm − pm}
≥ (1− dn(m)){α[χµ+ (1− χ)µ̃m]qm − pm}.
The following specifications of µ̃m may be possible depending on the con-
texts of interest. The first possibility is that µ̃m is exogenously fixed and con-
stant in m. In particular, when µ̃m = E[v|v < ṽ], it is as if the partially-naive
buyer believes that the seller with v > ṽ does not trade at any price. The
second, and perhaps more plausible, specification is that µ̃m = E[v|v < pm].
In this case, with weight 1 − χ, the naive buyer believes that only a seller
whose value is lower than its associated price wishes to trade. In that sense,
(with weight 1−χ) the naive buyer takes into account the fact that rational
sellers never wish to trade at a price higher than own value. The third case
is, in line with the definition of the partial cursedness in Eyster and Rabin
(2005), that µ̃m is based on the expected value. That is, µ̃m = E[v|v ∈ Vm]
where Vm is the set of the seller’s types who choose option m in equilibrium,
and in this sense, the partially-naive buyer’s expectation is a weighted av-
erage of the fully-naive case (with weight χ) and rational case (with weight
1− χ).
In all of these three applications, our main messages and insights remain
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to hold: Naive buyers underestimate the selection and wish to trade at a
relatively low price (which is lower than αµ in these cases), while it creates
a possibility of trades between (relatively) high-value sellers and rational
buyers.
6.2 General mechanisms
In the main part of the paper, we only consider the class of menus. One
may wonder if more general mechanisms, for example, by asking the buyer
to reveal his behavioral type. In this section, we argue that the main qual-
itative results of the paper remain similar even if we consider more general
mechanisms as long as they satisfy certain features that we think are relevant
in the current trading context.
Formally, define a general trading mechanism by (M1,M2;A1, A2; q, p)
with finite M1,M2. Here, M1 is interpreted as the seller’s message set, M2 is
interpreted as the buyer’s message set, q : M1 ×M2 → [0, 1] is the trading
probability, and p : M1 ×M2 → [0, 1] is the transfer. For each i ∈ {1, 2},
the binary set Ai = {0, 1} represents i’s acceptance decision, and the trade
with (q, p) happens if and only if both i choose ai = 1. The timing of the
mechanism is as follows: First, each agent i simultaneously chooses mi ∈Mi,
and after observing m = (m1,m2), each agent i simultaneously chooses ai ∈
Ai = {0, 1}. Consider a (weak) perfect-Bayesian equilibrium as the solution
concept.
Although this formulation might look non-standard, this is to capture the
key feature of the lemon’s problem that the buyer makes an inference about
the seller’s type observing the seller’s choice, and a trade is only upon mutual
agreement.18 See the seminal work by Green and Laffont (1987) which intro-
18Indeed, if a mechanism can ask both the seller and the buyer report both mi and ai
simultaneously (which essentially means that the distinction between mi and ai is non-
essential), then higher expected social surplus might be possible. As extensively discussed
in Green and Laffont (1987), however, we think that the improvement is not well-justified
within the lemon’s trading context.
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duces and studies some general properties of such posterior implementation.
This class of general trading mechanisms is richer than the class of menu
mechanisms considered in the paper. Indeed, a menu mechanism is a special
case of a general trading mechanism with the additional requirement of trivial
M2. In this sense, it is potentially possible that some non-menu mechanism
strictly improves the optimal menu mechanism. Although further investi-
gations of general mechanisms are left for future research, such mechanisms
should possess similar qualitative features as in the menu mechanism. In
particular, there must exist v∗ > 0 such that the seller with v < v∗ trades
only with the naive buyer. On the other hand, because the naive buyer does
not accept any trade with price greater than αµ, the seller with v > αµ can
trade only with the rational buyer. In this sense, the outcome must exhibit
some form of “double-separation” as in Theorem 1.
Proposition 6. In a (non-trivial) general trading mechanism (M1,M2;A1, A2; q, p),
there exists v∗ > 0 such that the seller with v < v∗ trades only with the naive
buyer, and the seller with v > αµ trades only with the rational buyer.
For example, when a distribution is binary (i.e., v ∈ {0, 1} with αµ < 1),
Proposition 6 immediately implies that the menu mechanism considered in
the previous sections is optimal among all general trading mechanisms.
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A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1.
The following lemma collects some key properties of the equilibria. Fix any
menu (qm, pm)
M
m=0 and any associated equilibrium (σ, d).
Let Vm ⊆ [0, 1] denote the set of the seller types who choose m, i.e.,
Vm = {v ∈ [0, 1]|σ(v) = m}. By the single-crossing property, each Vm must
be an interval.
Without loss of generality, assume that each Vm for m = 1, . . . ,M is
non-trivial in that inf Vm < supVm; and that m > m
′ implies v ≤ v′ for all
v ∈ Vm, v′ ∈ Vm′ .
Let v0 = 1, vm = supVm for each m 6= 0, and vM+1 = 0. Because each
Vm is non-trivial for m 6= 0, we have 1 = v0 ≥ v1 > · · · > vM+1 = 0.
For each m ≥ 1, define:
xm = (ψdr(m) + (1− ψ)dn(m))qm.
ym = (ψdr(m) + (1− ψ)dn(m))pm.
Without loss of generality, assume xm > 0 for all m = 1, . . . ,M . Let m
∗ =
max{m|dn(m) = 0}, which is well-defined by assuming dn(q0, p0) = 0 without
loss of generality.
Lemma 1. 1. ym − xmvm = ym−1 − xm−1vm for m = 2, . . . ,M ; and y1 −
x1v1 ≥ 0;





for m = 1, . . . ,M − 1;
3. dr(M) = 0, and hence, xM ≤ 1− ψ;
4. ym ≤ αµxm if m > m∗;
5. ym ≥ αµxm if 1 ≤ m ≤ m∗;
6. xm∗ ≤ ψ;
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7. αE[v|v ∈ Vm] ≥ ymxm if m ≤ m
∗.
Proof. The first property is implied by the seller’s incentive compatibility
(for m ≥ 2) and individual rationality (for m = 1).
The second property is implied by the seller’s incentive compatibility and
the assumption that each Vm is non-trivial for m 6= 0.
For the third property, if dr(M) = 1, then the rational buyer’s individual
rationality constraint implies:
0 ≤ αE[v|v ∈ VM ]− pM ≤ αE[v|v ∈ (0, vM)]− vM ,
contradicting our assumption of severe adverse selection given by Inequal-
ity (1).
For the fourth property, because the naive buyer cannot accept any price
above αµ, we have ym∗+1 ≤ αµxm∗+1. Then, the second property implies
ym ≤ αµxm for all m > m∗.
Conversely, for the fifth property, dn(m
∗) = 0 implies ym∗ ≥ αµxm∗ , and
by the first property, ym > αµxm if 1 ≤ m ≤ m∗. This also implies dn(m) = 0
if 1 ≤ m ≤ m∗.
The sixth property is immediate from dn(m
∗) = 0.
For the last property, because m < m∗, we have dn(m) = 0. However,
because xm > 0, it must be that dr(m) > 0. Thus, the rational buyer’s
individual rationality constraint implies αE[v|v ∈ Vm]qm ≥ pm.
Now consider the problem of maximizing the expected social surplus
among all possible ((vm, xm, ym)
M
m=1,m









sub. to m∗ ∈ {0, . . . ,M}, xm ∈ [0, 1], 0 = vM+1 < . . . < v1 ≤ v0 = 1
(Properties 1-7 above).
Observe that the above problem admits a solution, even though some
constraints are based on strict inequalities. First, consider a set of restricted
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problems where M is fixed (to any number between 1 and M), and let Sol(M)
denote the solution of this restricted problem with fixed M , in case it exists.
Let M ⊆ {1, . . . ,M} denote the set of M where Sol(M) exists. If this set
is nonempty, then clearly the solution of the unrestricted problem (i.e., with
flexible M ≤M) is in {Sol(M)|M ∈M}; and indeed, it is nonempty, because
Sol(1) exists: By Eyster and Rabin (2005), a one-price menu mechanism
{(0, 0), (1, αµ)} is known to be optimal.
It is straightforward to see that a solution to the above problem implies
a menu mechanism that indeed achieves the maximized value.
Now we show that the solutions in the above (unrestricted) problem is a
doubly-separating menu mechanism (qm, pm)
M
m=0 (for some M) with (q0, p0) =
(0, 0) and (qM , pM) = (1, αµ).
Lemma 2. For the solution in the above problem, m∗ = M−1, yM = αµxM ,
and xM = 1− ψ.
Proof. Let ((vm, xm, ym)
M
m=1,m
∗) denote a feasible policy in the above prob-





, and thus, in what follows, we focus on the two cases:
either yM < αµxM , or xM < 1− ψ.
Case 1: yM < αµxM








+ ε < min{ yM−1
xM−1
, αµ}; v̂M(∈ (vM , 1))
is such that ŷM − xM v̂M = yM−1 − xM−1v̂M ; and all the other components
are the same as ((vm, xm, ym)
M
m=1,m
∗). Clearly, this new policy is feasible in
the above problem, but achieves a strictly higher expected surplus, as the
probability of trade increases from xM−1 to xM for v ∈ (vM , v̂M).
Case 2: xM < 1− ψ.




for sufficiently small ε > 0: x̂M = xM + ε(< 1 − ψ); v̂M(∈ (vM , 1)) is
such that yM
xM
x̂M − x̂M v̂M = yM−1 − pM−1v̂M ; and all the other components
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are the same as ((vm, xm, ym)
M
m=1,m
∗). Clearly, this new policy is feasible
in the above problem, but achieves strictly higher expected surplus, as the
probability of trade increases from xM to x̂M for v < v̂M .
Proof of Proposition 1.
Suppose that there is an optimal menu mechanism with M ≥ 3, which we
denote by {(qm, pm)}Mm=0. It suffices to construct another optimal menu mech-
anism with M = 2.
It is without loss to assume that pm
qm
is decreasing in m, pM
qM
= αµ < . . . <
p1
q1
≤ 1, qM = 1, and that there exists a sequence of threshold seller types
0 = vM+1 < . . . < v1 ≤ v0 = 1 such that any seller type v ∈ (vm+1, vm)
chooses option (qm, pm) in the associated equilibrium. More specifically, we
have v1 ≤ p1q1 , v2 is the seller type who is indifferent between (q1, p1) and
(q2, p2), and so on. Without loss, we can assume that the rational buyer’s
individual rationality given (q2, p2) is binding: αE[v|v ∈ (v3, v2)] = p2q2 .
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Consider an alternative mechanism, which is exactly the same as the origi-





with {(qm, pm)}Mm=3) where the same v3 is indifferent between (q′2, p′2) and
(q3, p3), and the rational buyer’s individual rationality holds with equality,
that is, αE[v|v ∈ (v3, k′2)] = k′2, where k′2 =
p′2
q′2
. Let k2 =
p2
q2
. In what follows,
we focus on the case where k′2 ≤ 1; the other case is similar.
The expected social surplus in the new mechanism is higher than in the
19If αE[v|v ∈ (v3, v2)] > p2q2 , then we can be strictly better off by modifying the mecha-
nism as follows. Fix ε > 0 small, and consider an alternative mechanism {(q̂m, p̂m)}Mm=0,
with p̂2 = p2 − ε, q̂2 = q2 − εv3 , and the rest is the same as {(qm, pm)}
M
m=0. The same




Note that all the constraints on the buyer side continue to be satisfied. The welfare change
with small ε is approximately (v2 − v3)v2f(v2)−
∫ v2
v3
vdF > 0 as vf(v) is increasing for a
power distribution.
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Note that the new mechanism has exactly one less option than in the original
mechanism. Therefore, if ∆ ≥ 0, then we complete the proof by induction.
From here on, the notation is modified as follows: We use v instead of v3,
βv instead of v2, and δv instead of k
′
2. Note that β ≥ 1 is a free parameter,






F (δv)− F (v)
.
By construction, we have δ ≥ β ≥ 1.


































xdF (k2 − v)− βv
∫ βv
v
xdF (δ − 1)−
∫ δβv
βv








F (βv)− F (v)
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k2 − v =
δ(F (δv)− F (v))
∫ βv
v









k2 − βv =
δ(F (δv)− F (v))
∫ βv
v















δ(F (δv)− F (v))
∫ βv
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δ(F (δv)− F (v))
∫ βv
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δ(F (δv)− F (βv))
∫ βv
v










δ(F (δv)− F (v))
∫ βv
v






Because F (δv)F (βv) = F (δβv)F (v) and
∫ b
a
xdF = c(bF (b) − aF (a)) for
any a < b for some constant c > 0, we finally have:
∆′ ∝ F (v)
(
δ(F (δv)− F (βv))
∫ βv
v







δ(F (δv)− F (v))
∫ βv
v





= δF (v)(F (δv)− F (βv))(βvF (βv)− vF (v))− F (v)(F (βv)− F (v))(δvF (δv)− βvF (βv))
−δF (βv)(F (δv)− F (v))(βvF (βv)− vF (v))− βF (βv)(F (βv)− F (v))(δvF (δv)− vF (v))
= 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.
We consider a two-option mechanism of the form: {(0, 0), (q, p), (1, αµ)},
where q ' 0, p = kq with k > αµ. We show that, if vf(v) is (locally) strictly
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increasing at v = αµ, then this two-option mechanism achieves strictly higher
expected welfare than the (optimal) one-option mechanism {(0, 0), (1, αµ)}.
Given the two-option mechanism, let v∗ denote the seller type who is
indifferent between offering (q, p) and (1, αµ):
(1− ψ)(αµ− v∗) = ψ(kq − qv∗);
equivalently, v∗ = (1−ψ)αµ−ψkq
1−ψ−ψq .























which is positive if vf(v) is (locally) strictly increasing at v = αµ.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Consider the following menu mechanism: {(qm, pm)}Mm=0 = {(0, 0), (1, p), (1, αµ)}
with p > αµ. In the associated equilibrium, the seller with v < v(ψ) chooses
(1, αµ), which is accepted only by the naive buyer; while the seller with
v ∈ (v(ψ), p) chooses (1, p), which is accepted only by the rational buyer,
where v(ψ) represents the indifferent type:
ψ(p− v(ψ)) = (1− ψ)(αµ− v(ψ)) ⇔ v(ψ) = αµ− p− αµ
1− 2ψ
ψ,
which is positive if ψ is sufficiently close to 0.
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Proof of Proposition 4.
Fix any menu mechanism and its associated equilibrium. Let x(v) denote the
probability of trading conditional on the seller type v, and let y(v) denote
the expected transfer conditional on that the seller type is v.
Suppose that the buyer’s ex ante expected payoff (i.e., the buyer’s ex-
pected payoff before realizing his own type) is non-negative in this equilib-
rium: ∫
v
(αvx(v)− y(v))dF ≥ 0.
It suffices to show that we must have x(v) = 0 for all v.
Recall that our assumption of severe adverse selection, Inequality (1),
means that only the no-trade outcome is incentive-feasible if there is no
naive buyer (Samuelson, 1984). Precisely, if {(x(v), y(v))}v∈[0,1] satisfies:
(IC-r) : y(v)− vx(v) ≥ y(v′)− vx(v′), ∀v, v′




(αvx(v)− y(v))dF ≥ 0,
then we must have x(v) = 0 for all v.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Consider Problem (2;φ) for any given φ ≥ 0. Lemma 1 holds in this problem,
because it is purely the implication of the incentive constraints of the seller
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and buyer, and does not depend on the principal’s objective. Existence of
m∗ and v∗ that satisfy the above conditions is then immediate.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Fix any mechanism in the class of general trading mechanisms and its as-
sociated equilibrium. Given the buyer’s behavior in the equilibrium, the
seller is facing the problem of choosing m1 ∈ M1 optimally (assuming that
m2, a1, a2 are optimally chosen), where each choice is associated with the
expected continuation trade outcome denoted by (q(m1), p(m1)). Without
loss of generality, assume that different choices of the seller induce different
expected trade outcomes.
Then, the seller’s choice of m1 ∈ M1 must induce the interval-partition
structure because of the single-crossing payoff function. That is, there exist
{vm}Mm=0 for some M ∈ N such that 0 = vM+1 > vM > . . . > v0 = 1 and
those in the same interval [vm+1, vm] choose the same message in M1 in the
equilibrium.
In particular, take the interval [0, vM ]. Given the seller’s choice of m1 and
the rational buyer’s choice of m2, the severe adverse selection assumption
implies that either the seller chooses a1 = 0 or the rational buyer chooses
a2 = 0. Thus, trade is not possible between them. However, the mechanism
being non-trivial implies that the seller must trade with the naive buyer.
Therefore, we complete the proof by setting v∗ = vM .
B Optimal Mechanism and Its Properties un-
der Power Distribution
This section investigates properties of the optimal menu mechanism under
Power distribution (with M = 2, thanks to Proposition 1).
To investigate the naive type’s payoff under the optimal mechanism with
incentive-feasible cross-subsidization in Example 2.2, we focus on the case in
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which rational type’s IR is not binding; when rational type’s IR is binding,
there is no incentive-feasible cross subsidization from the rational type to the
naive type. In this case, (q1, p1) = (1, 1) and (q2, p2) = (1, αµ). The threshold
type v∗ is obtained from the seller’s indifference condition: (1−ψ)(αµ−v∗) =
ψ(1− v∗) ⇔ v∗ = (1−ψ)αµ−ψ
1−2ψ . Note that v
∗ < αµ if and only if αµ < 1 and
ψ < 1
2












(αγvγ−αµγvγ−1)dv = [α γ
1+γ
v1+γ−αµvγ]v∗0 = −αµ(1−v∗)(v∗)γ <
0. Also, rational type’s expected payoff is
∫ 1
v∗




γvγ−1)dv = [α γ
1+γ
v1+γ − vγ]1v∗ = αµ− 1 + (v∗)γ − αµ(v∗)1+γ.
The expected buyer surplus is:
− (1− ψ)αµ(1− v∗)(v∗)γ + ψ
[
αµ− 1 + (v∗)γ − αµ(v∗)1+γ
]
= − (1− 2ψ)αµ(1− v∗)(v∗)γ − ψαµ(v∗)γ + ψ [αµ− 1 + (v∗)γ]
= − (1− 2ψ)αµ(1− v∗)(v∗)γ − ψ(1− αµ)[1− (v∗)γ] < 0.
Although the ex ante expected buyer surplus is always non-positive and max-
imized at ψ = 1 as in Proposition 4, it can be non-monotonic. For example,
at ψ = 0, the ex ante expected buyer surplus is decreasing in ψ if α and γ
are sufficiently small.
As discussed in Example 2.2, naive type’s actual expected payoff with the
maximal cross-subsidization is:
− αµ(1− v∗)(v∗)γ + ψ
1− ψ
[






























































{αµ− 1 + [1− (α− 1)γ − γv∗](v∗)γ} .
Because [1 − (α − 1)γ − γv](v)γ subject to v ∈ (0, αµ) is maximized at
v = 1− αµ, the derivative is at most
1
(1− ψ)2






(1− αµ) [1− (1− αµ)γ] < 0.
Hence, the naive type’s actual expected payoff with the maximal cross-
subsidization is decreasing in ψ, implying that the payoff of the naive type
is strictly lower than the one-price mechanism.
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= (1− ψ)(α− 1)[µv1+γ]v∗0 + ψ(α− 1)[µv1+γ]1v∗
= (1− ψ)(α− 1)µ(v∗)1+γ − ψ(α− 1)µ(v∗)1+γ + ψ(α− 1)µ
= (α− 1)µ
[
(1− 2ψ)(v∗)1+γ + ψ
]
.
The derivative at ψ = 0 is positive, for example, if γ < 1
5
and α < 5
4
.
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